

REMARKS

This is a full and timely response to the final Office Action mailed November 16, 2005. Claims 1 – 20 remain pending. Applicant respectfully traverses all the rejections and any findings of official notice in the final Office Action. Reconsideration and allowance of the application and presently pending claims are respectfully requested.

I. General Remarks

Applicant submits that, before addressing the claims individually below, a number of general remarks may be helpful in considering the differences and potential technical advantages afforded by the disclosed email systems and methods over the cited references.

One problem with conventional e-mail addresses is that such e-mail addresses may not consist of characters that correspond with identifying information related to the owner of the e-mail address. Furthermore, even if some of such identifying information is included in the e-mail address, conventional e-mail addresses are not formatted in a standardized manner. Accordingly, without previous knowledge of a recipient's e-mail address (assuming the recipient even has a conventional e-mail address) or a directory that otherwise correlates a specific recipient to a conventional email address, transmitting an e-mail to a desired recipient is not practical, if not impossible. Similarly, creating a directory of conventional e-mail addresses that can be used to contact a desired recipient without prior knowledge of the association between the conventional e-mail addresses and its associated user is also not practical. Thus, it should be apparent that ascertaining a conventionally formatted e-mail address of a person without first obtaining the address

from the recipient, or from others that pass on the specific e-mail address is nearly impossible.

Accordingly, one objective of the disclosed systems and methods is to provide the capability to send an e-mail message to any desired recipient using a new, standardized e-mail address which can be generated based on, for example, the user's name and location. It is not necessary that the users have prior existing conventional email addresses, as the new, standardized e-mail address can be created for every individual based on, for example, a name and location. The addressed recipient has the ability to receive and read any communications sent to this standardized address, if they so please, and can reply using the standardized e-mail address or any other conventional e-mail address to retain full control over which address is returned to the sender. According to some embodiments, if no reply is sent, the sender has no idea if the message had been read or not, thus maintaining privacy.

The disclosed systems and methods solve this problem by, for example, providing a database with structured standardized unique master indexes for every recipient that can themselves be used as e-mail addresses and to which other data, including existing conventional e-mail addresses, can be attached and identified. Claims 1 and 7, for example, are directed to a system and program of instructions for generating "a set of standardized electronic mail addresses," where an electronic mail address is generated based on a "personal name code" and "location code."

The Office Action rejects independent claims 1 and 7, among others, under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,292,211 to Pena ("*Pena*") in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,930,479 to Hall ("*Hall*") in view of U.S. Patent

No. 6,298,128 to Ramey (“*Ramey*”). None of these references, separately or in combination, are designed for, or are capable of, generating “a set of standardized electronic mail addresses” based on a “personal name code” and “location code.”

In contrast, *Hall* is apparently directed to: restricting unwanted or “junk” mail (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting “hate mail” (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting advertisements (*See*, col. 2, line 8; col. 2, line 11); and prevention of undesirable e-mail (*See*, col 3, lines 41 – 45). Even assuming, *arguendo*, that an email address is provided for an intended recipient, the email address provided is ***intended to make it difficult*** to identify a recipient’s email address in order to reduce spam, hate mail, *etc.* This is wholly unlike the disclosed systems and methods which generates standardized email addresses to make it ***easy to identify a recipient’s email address*** such that e-mails can be delivered to an intended recipient without prior knowledge of the recipient’s email address.

Likewise, *Pena* is apparently directed to assisting unskilled users and others without computers to transfer data and communicate. (*See*, col. 2; line 6 – Col. 3, line 35). There is no disclosure of the creation of any kind of standardized email address. At most, *Pena* discloses that subscribers “type the name of the intended recipient subscriber” and a processing unit is then used “determine from the database the appropriate e-mail address of the intended recipient subscriber”. (Col. 4, lines 48 – 53). Applicant fails to rationalize the relevance of such a system with respect to the generation of standardized electronic email addresses.

Ramey is apparently directed to receiving and send/resending communications (*See*, Abstract lines 1-2) in different media. (*See*, col. 1, lines 4 – 7; col. 2, line 62 – col. 3

line 9). FIG. 2 includes “a table describing the structure and contents of a database.” (Col. 3, lines 50-51). The table includes “e-mail identification information including the e-mail address, e-mail name, and other attributes (represented by an ellipsis) related to e-mail of that correspondent.” (Col. 5, lines 36 – 39). However, there is no disclosure of any generation of an email address at all. Further, the email addresses appearing in FIG. 2 are not described as being standardized. Rather, the table of FIG. 2 is described as being used in a look-up manner in order to potentially identify the sender. (*See*, col. 6 line 62 – col. 7, line 13). Applicant fails to see the relevance of such a system with respect to the generation of standardized electronic email addresses.

Accordingly, Applicant submits that, as will be discussed in more detail below, the proposed combination of references do not disclose, teach, or suggest the claimed invention. Rather, the cited references are believed to be directed to completely different systems and methods that solve vastly different problems. Furthermore, Applicant submits that the proposed combination of references is improper for at least the reason that *Hall* appears to teach away from the proposed combination.

I. Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 are Patentable Over *Pena* in view of *Hall* and *Ramey*

The Office Action rejects claims 1, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,292,211 to *Pena* (“*Pena*”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,930,479 to *Hall* (“*Hall*”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,298,128 to *Ramey* (“*Ramey*”).

Independent Claim 1

Independent Claim 1 is patentable over the proposed combination of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey* for at least the reason that neither *Pena*, *Hall*, nor *Ramey* disclose, teach, or suggest at least the feature of instructions operable to “***generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code***” as recited in claim 1.

Pena, as an initial matter, does not even appear to disclose instructions operable to “provide a personal name code indicative of the name of a person” nor “provide a location code indicative of a known location of the person” as also recited in claim 1. Indeed, the Office Action indicates that “*Pena* does not specifically mention about standardized mail addresses.” (Office Action, pg. 3). At most, *Pena* discloses that users are “assigned a unique e-mail address that would be added to a computer database of subscribers.” (Col. 4, lines 23- 25). Accordingly, not only are the e-mail addresses of *Pena* not “standardized,” there is not even any “generation” of email addresses at all.

However the Office Action alleges that “*Hall* discloses a well-known concept of using standardized mail addresses.” (Office Action, pg. 3). However, even assuming, *arguendo*, that *Hall* discloses a type of standardized email address, the proposed combination of *Hall* and *Pena* do not disclose instructions operable to “generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code.” That is, Applicant agrees with the Office Action assertion that “*Pena* and *Hall* do not specifically mention about electronic mail address based on the personal name code and the location code.” (Office Action, pg. 3).

In view of this deficiency, the Office Action alleges that “Ramey discloses a well-known concept of using electronic mail address based on the personal name code and the location code.” (Office Action, pg. 4).

However, not only does *Ramey* not disclose any generation of an email address at all, there is no disclosure of an email address having a “personal name code” and “location code” as claimed. The email addresses appearing in FIG. 2 are not even described as being standardized. Rather, FIG. 2 includes “a table describing the structure and contents of a database.” (Col. 3, lines 50-51). The table includes “e-mail identification information including the e-mail address, e-mail name, and other attributes (represented by an ellipsis) related to e-mail of that correspondent.” (Col. 5, lines 36 – 39). The table of FIG. 2 is described as being used in a look-up manner in order to potentially identify the sender. (*See*, col. 6 line 62 – col. 7, line 13). Applicant attaches an image of the table of FIG. 2 that allegedly contains the e-mail address having the claimed “personal name code” and “location code”:

ENTRY	CALLER ID			E-MAIL			EXTENSIONS		
	NUMBER	NAME	...	ADDRESS	REAL NAME	...	FAX NUMBER	POSTAL ADDRESS	...
1	555-4321	John Ray							
2	555-1234	Bill Bey		BBey @ iii.com	Bill Bey				
3				JRay @ ab.com	John Ray				
4	555-4231	Tom Hays		THays @ lli.com	Tom Hays				
5	5551324	Hank Day							
6				CTrai @ ll.com	Charlie Trei				

Fig. 2

As shown, even assuming, *arguendo*, that a portion of a listed email address forms part of a name (*i.e.* entry 1: “Bill Bey” = BBey), there is no “location code.”

Accordingly, in view of the teachings of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey*, Applicant is perplexed as to the alleged disclosure by these references of instructions operable to “generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code” as recited in claim 1.

Rather, the references (separately or in combination) do not disclose any of instructions operable to (1) “provide a personal name code indicative of the name of a person,” (2) “provide a location code indicative of a known location of the person”; nor (3) “generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code” as recited in claim 1.

Furthermore, Applicant submits that the combination of references is improper for at least the reason that *Hall* appears to teach away from using an email address that is “based on said personal name code and said location code.” In contrast, *Hall* is apparently directed to: restricting unwanted or “junk” mail (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting “hate mail” (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting advertisements (*See*, col. 2, line 8; col. 2, line 11); and prevention of undesirable e-mail (*See*, col 3, lines 41 – 45).

Thus, the email address of *Hall* is apparently intended to make it ***difficult*** to identify a recipient’s email address in order to reduce spam, hate mail, *etc.* This is wholly unlike the disclosed systems and methods which generates standardized email addresses to make it ***easy to identify a recipient’s email address*** such that e-mails can be delivered to an intended recipient without prior knowledge of the recipient’s email address. Accordingly, one skilled in the art would not combine *Hall* with either of *Pena* and *Ramey* as alleged.

Accordingly, and for at least these reasons, Applicant submits that claim 1 is patentable over the proposed combination of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey*. Furthermore, in that claim 1 is believed to be allowable, claims 2 – 6 and 13 – 16 which depend there from are allowable for at least the same reasons.

Independent Claim 7

Independent Claim 7 is patentable over the proposed combination of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey* for at least the reason that neither *Pena*, *Hall*, nor *Ramey* disclose, teach, or suggest at least the feature of logic configured to “***generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code***” as recited in claim 7.

Pena, as an initial matter, does not even appear to disclose logic configured to “generate a personal name code indicative of the name of a person” nor “generate a location code indicative of a known location of the person” as also recited in claim 7. Indeed, the Office Action indicates that “*Pena* does not specifically mention about standardized mail addresses.” (Office Action, pg. 3). At most, *Pena* discloses that users are “assigned a unique e-mail address that would be added to a computer database of subscribers.” (Col. 4, lines 23- 25). Accordingly, not only are the e-mail addresses of *Pena* not “standardized,” there is not even any “generation” of email addresses at all.

However the Office Action alleges that “*Hall* discloses a well-known concept of using standardized mail addresses.” (Office Action, pg. 3). However, even assuming, *arguendo*, that *Hall* discloses a type of standardized email address, the proposed combination of *Hall* and *Pena* do not disclose logic configured to “generate an electronic

mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code.”

That is, Applicant agrees with the Office Action assertion that “Pena and Hall do not specifically mention about electronic mail address based on the personal name code and the location code.” (Office Action, pg. 3).

In view of this deficiency, the Office Action alleges that “Ramey discloses a well-known concept of using electronic mail address based on the personal name code and the location code.” (Office Action, pg. 4).

However, not only does *Ramey* not disclose any generation of an email address at all, there is no disclosure of an email address having a “personal name code” and “location code” as claimed. The email addresses appearing in FIG. 2 are not even described as being standardized. Rather, FIG. 2 includes “a table describing the structure and contents of a database.” (Col. 3, lines 50-51). The table includes “e-mail identification information including the e-mail address, e-mail name, and other attributes (represented by an ellipsis) related to e-mail of that correspondent.” (Col. 5, lines 36 – 39). The table of FIG. 2 is described as being used in a look-up manner in order to potentially identify the sender. (*See*, col. 6 line 62 – col. 7, line 13). Applicant attaches an image of the table of FIG. 2 that allegedly contains the e-mail address having the claimed “personal name code” and “location code”:

ENTRY	CALLER ID			E-MAIL			EXTENSIONS		
	NUMBER	NAME	...	ADDRESS	REAL NAME	...	FAX NUMBER	POSTAL ADDRESS	...
1	555-4321	John Ray							
2	555-1234	Bill Bey		BBey @ iil.com	Bill Bey				
3				JRay @ ab.com	John Ray				
4	555-4231	Tom Hays		THays @ lli.com	Tom Hays				
5	5551324	Hank Day							
6				CTrei @ ll.com	Charlie Trei				

Fig. 2

As shown, even assuming, *arguendo*, that a portion of a listed email address forms part of a name (*i.e.* entry 1: “Bill Bey” = BBey), there is no “location code.”

Accordingly, in view of the teachings of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey*, Applicant is perplexed as to the alleged disclosure by these references of instructions operable to “generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code” as recited in claim 7.

Rather, the references (separately or in combination) do not disclose any of logic configured to (1) “generate a personal name code indicative of the name of a person,” (2) “generate a location code indicative of a known location of the person”; nor (3) “generate an electronic mail address for said person based on said personal name code and said location code” as recited in claim 7.

Furthermore, Applicant submits that the combination of references is improper for at least the reason that *Hall* appears to teach away from using an email address that is “based on said personal name code and said location code.” In contrast, *Hall* is apparently directed to: restricting unwanted or “junk” mail (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting “hate mail” (*See*, col. 1, line 48; Col. 2, line 11); restricting

advertisements (*See*, col. 2, line 8; col. 2, line 11); and prevention of undesirable e-mail (*See*, col 3, lines 41 – 45).

Thus, the email address of *Hall* is apparently intended to make it *difficult* to identify a recipient's email address in order to reduce spam, hate mail, *etc.* This is wholly unlike the claimed system for generating standardized email addresses that make it *easy to identify a recipient's email address* such that e-mails can be delivered to an intended recipient without prior knowledge of the recipient's email address. Accordingly, one skilled in the art would not combine *Hall* with either of *Pena* and *Ramey* as alleged.

Accordingly, and for at least these reasons, Applicant submits that claim 7 is patentable over the proposed combination of *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey*. Furthermore, in that claim 7 is believed to be allowable, claims 8 – 12 and 17 – 20 which depend therefrom are allowable for at least the same reasons.

Dependent Claims 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19

Applicant submits that the rejection to dependent claims 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 is rendered moot in light of any of the arguments made above and, therefore, claims 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 are allowable as a matter of law for at least the reason that claims 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 contain all features and elements of their corresponding independent claim. For at least this reason, Applicant requests that the rejection of claims 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 be withdrawn.

III. Claims 2 and 8 are Patentable Over *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey* in view of *Toyoda*

The Office Action further rejects claims 2 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over *Pena*, *Hall* and *Ramey* in view of U.S. Patent No.

6,897,985 to Toyoda (“*Toyoda*”). Applicant submits that the rejection to dependent claims 2 and 8 is rendered moot in light of any of the arguments made above and, therefore, claims 2 and 8 are allowable as a matter of law for at least the reason that claims 2 and 8 contain all features and elements of their corresponding independent claim.

IV. Claims 4 and 10 are Patentable Over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in view of *Oseto*

The Office Action further rejects claims 4 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,097,797 to Oseto (“*Oseto*”). Applicant submits that the rejection to dependent claims 4 and 10 is rendered moot in light of any of the arguments made above and, therefore, claims 4 and 10 are allowable as a matter of law for at least the reason that claims 4 and 10 contain all features and elements of their corresponding independent claim.

V. Claims 5 and 11 are Patentable Over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in view of *Grauman*

The Office Action further rejects claims 5 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,707,472 to Grauman (“*Grauman*”). Applicant submits that the rejection to dependent claims 5 and 11 is rendered moot in light of any of the arguments made above and, therefore, claims 5 and 11 are allowable as a matter of law for at least the reason that claims 5 and 11 contain all features and elements of their corresponding independent claim.

VI. Claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 are Patentable Over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in View of *Official Notice*

The Office Action further rejects claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over *Pena, Hall and Ramey* in view of Official Notice.

As an initial matter, Applicant submits that the rejection to dependent claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 is rendered moot in light of any of the arguments made above and, therefore, claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 are allowable as a matter of law for at least the reason that claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 contain all features and elements of their corresponding independent claim.

In addition, despite that none of *Pena, Hall and Ramey* disclose each and every element of claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20, the Office Action has apparently taken official notice of various claim limitations as being “well-known.”

Specifically, as to claims 6, 12, 16 and 20, the Office Action recites that “Official Notice’ is taken that both the concept and advantages of providing attaching [sic] a unique identifier to the person’s electronic mail address and after determining that the electronic mail address is non-unique attaching an indicator is well known and expected in the art.” (Office Action, pg. 8).

Applicant traverses this finding for the reason that, in the context of the claimed systems and methods for generating a set of standardized electronic mail addresses, the finding that “the concept and advantages of providing attaching [sic] a unique identifier to the person’s electronic mail address and after determining that the electronic mail address is non-unique attaching an indicator” is well known and expected in the art should not be

considered well-known because of the specificity of this finding within the claimed combination.

Further, as to claims 14 and 16, the Office Action recites that “ ‘Official Notice’ is taken that both the concept and advantages of providing the database of electronic mail addresses on-line is well known and expected in the art.” (Office Action, pg. 9).

Applicant traverses this finding for the reason that, in the context of the claimed systems and methods for generating a set of standardized electronic mail addresses, the finding that “both the concept and advantages of providing the database of electronic mail addresses on-line is well known and expected in the art” is well known and expected in the art should not be considered well-known because of the specificity of this finding within the claimed combination.

Accordingly, for at least these reasons, the rejection of dependent claims 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 should be withdrawn and the claims allowed.

VII. Prior Art Made of Record


The prior art made of record has been considered, but is not believed to affect the patentability of the presently pending claims.

CONCLUSION

The Applicant respectfully submits that all claims are now in condition for allowance, and request that the Examiner pass this case to issuance. If, in the opinion of the Examiner, a telephonic conference would expedite the examination of this matter, the Examiner is invited to call the undersigned attorney at (770) 933-9500.

No fee is believed to be due in connection with this response. If, however, any fee is deemed to be payable, you are hereby authorized to charge any such fee to Deposit Account No. 20-0778.

Respectfully submitted,




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Stephanie Riley